Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 16 | Issue 2

Article 5

2009

No Child Left Behind Bars: The Need to Combat
Cruel and Unusual Punishment of State Statutory
Rape Laws
Meredith Cohen

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
Recommended Citation
Meredith Cohen, No Child Left Behind Bars: The Need to Combat Cruel and Unusual Punishment of State Statutory Rape Laws, 16 J. L. &
Pol'y (2008).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol16/iss2/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND BARS:
THE NEED TO COMBAT CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT OF STATE
STATUTORY RAPE LAWS
Meredith Cohen*
INTRODUCTION
Before he was convicted and incarcerated, Genarlow Wilson
was a model teenager.1 He had no criminal record and a 3.2 GPA.2
He was also a star football player and homecoming king.3 College
football coaches courted him regularly and offered full tuition
scholarships.4 Genarlow Wilson was released from prison on
October 26, 2007, after spending more than two years behind
bars.5 How did this seemingly ideal teenager end up in prison
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2009; B.A. Washington University in St.
Louis 2005.
1
Patrick Gilbert, Waiting For Justice, T HE BATTALION VIA U-W IRE , July
10, 2007.
2
Leonard Pitts Jr., Georgia’s Twisted Sense of Justice, VIRGINIAN P ILOT
& LEDGER-STAR, Apr. 4, 2007, at B9.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Brenda Goodman, Man Convicted as Teenager in Sex Case is Ordered
Freed By Georgia Court, N.Y. T IMES, Oct. 27, 2007, at A9. The Supreme
Court of Georgia held:
the [Superior Court of Monroe County] properly ruled that Wilson’s
sentence of ten years in prison for having consensual oral sex with a
fifteen-year-old girl when he was only seventeen years old constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment, but erred in convicting and sentencing
Wilson for a misdemeanor crime that did not exist when the conduct in
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instead of sitting at home and debating over which college to
attend? In December of 2003,6 Wilson and some of his teenage
friends rented rooms at a motel and had a New Year’s Eve Party.7
During the party, a fifteen-year-old girl performed oral sex on
Wilson, who was then seventeen years old.8 Wilson insisted that
the girl not only willingly performed the act, but in fact, initiated
the activity. 9 Nonetheless, Wilson was charged with aggravated
child molestation.10 He was offered a plea bargain, but “[h]e could
not see himself admitting to something he did not do, becoming a
registered sex offender, having that follow him for the rest of his
life, and being forbidden even to live in the same house with his
younger sister.”11 Consequently, Wilson was convicted of
aggravated child molestation and received a mandatory sentence of
ten years imprisonment without possibility of parole.12
question occurred.
Humphrey v. Wilson, 282 Ga. 520 (Ga. 2007). The case was remanded to the
habeas court for it to reverse Wilson’s conviction and discharge him from
custody. Id.
6
Gilbert, supra note 1.
7
Wilson v. The State, 279 Ga. App. 459 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
8
Id.
9
Pitts, supra note 2. Wilson characterized the sexual activity between
himself and the girl as “consensual” or “voluntary.” Wilson, 279 Ga. App. at
461.
10
Wilson, 279 Ga. App. at 459. At the time of conviction, the minimum
sentence was ten years in prison with no possibility of probation or parole and
the maximum sentence was thirty years in prison. Humphrey, 282 Ga. at 521.
11
Pitts, supra note 2. GA . CODE ANN . §42-1-12 (2006) would require
Wilson to register as a sex offender. Humphrey, 282 Ga. at 521. GA. CODE
ANN . §42-1-15 (2006) would prevent Wilson from living in the same house as
his sister because it prohibits convicted sex offenders from living within “1,000
feet of any child care facility, church, or area where minors congregate.” Id.
12
Wilson, 279 Ga. App. at 459. GA . CODE ANN § 16-6-4(a) (2006)
provides, “[a] person commits the offense of child molestation when he or she
does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under
the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either
the child or the person.” Id. at 460. GA . CODE ANN § 16-6-4(c) (2006), the
statute under which Wilson was convicted, provides that “[a] person commits
the offense of aggravated child molestation when such person commits an offense
of child molestation which act physically injures the child or involves an act of
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According to his sentence, before his release from prison
Wilson would have to provide prison officials with information,
including his residence and his photograph.13 That information,
along with the nature of his offense, would be forwarded to the
sheriff’s office14 who would post the content around the county in
which he lived and on the Internet.15 Further, under Georgia’s
residency restriction laws, when Wilson was released, he would not
be able to live or work within 1,000 feet of any child care facility,
church, or other area where minors congregate.16
The year after Wilson was sentenced, the Georgia state
legislature enacted a law that made consensual oral sex between
adolescents only a misdemeanor punishable by a one year sentence
with no sex offender registration requirements. 17 Thus, if the two
had instead engaged in sexual intercourse, Wilson’s crime would
have been a misdemeanor with only a one-year sentence.18
However, because the legislature decided not to make the law
retroactive,19 it left Wilson in prison for over two years until the
sodomy.” Id. And under GA. CODE ANN . § 17-10-6.1 (2006), aggravated child
molestation is a “serious violent felony” carrying a mandatory minimum
sentence of ten years without possibility of parole. Id.
13
Humphrey, 282 Ga. at 521.
14
Id. (noting that upon release, Wilson would have had to provide his new
address, his fingerprints, his social security number, his date of birth, and his
photograph).
15
Id.
16
Id.; see also Brenda Goodman, Georgia Justices Overturn Curb on Sex
Offenders, N.Y. T IMES, Nov. 22, 2007, at A26 (noting that although the
amendment dealing with residency has been overturned by the Georgia Supreme
Court, the provisions regarding employment and loitering are still in effect).
17
Gilbert, supra note 1; see also Humphrey, 282 Ga. at 522.
18
Sanford Brickner, Know Your Rights: Punishment For Sexual Activity
May Sometimes Be Excessive, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Aug. 10, 2007, at D2.
19
The legislature expressed the intent that “[t]he provisions of this Act
shall not affect or abate the status as a crime of any such act or omission which
occurred prior to the effective date of the Act repealing, repealing and reenacting,
or amending such law, nor shall the prosecution of such crime be abated as a
result of such repeal, repeal and reenactment, or amendment.” H.B. 1059, 148th
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006). The reasoning behind the law is that
recidivist sexual offenders, sexual offenders who use physical violence,
and sexual offenders who prey on children are sexual predators who
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Georgia Supreme Court ended his sentence.20
Wilson is not the only teen who has suffered legal
repercussions for his sexual activity. 21 In 1996, Michael Peterson
became a convicted sex offender in New Hampshire at age nineteen.
Peterson was arrested and convicted for having sex at a party with
a fifteen-year-old.22 Although he received a suspended sentence, he
has had to register as a sex offender for the past eleven years.23 As
a result of the state law governing sex offenders, Peterson, who is
now married with children, cannot coach his three children’s teams
or chaperone their school trips.24 Further, as a carpenter, Peterson
is not allowed to work at sites near children because of residency
restrictions.25 Laurie Peterson, Michael’s wife, acknowledges that
her husband’s behavior at the time was not admirable, but
nevertheless urged the New Hampshire Legislature to pass a bill
that would prosecute fewer teenagers for consensual sex.26 The bill
would also permit some people who were younger than twentyone at the time they were arrested for consensual teenage sex acts
to petition a judge to be removed from the state’s sex offender
present an extreme threat to the public safety. Many sexual offenders are
extremely likely to use physical violence and to repeat their offenses;
and some sexual offenders commit many offenses, have many more
victims than are ever reported, and are prosecuted for only a fraction of
their crimes . . . [and] this makes the cost of sexual offender
victimization to society at large, while incalculable, clearly exorbitant.
Id.
20

Goodman, supra note 5. The Court noted that the “severe felony
punishment and sex offender registration imposed on Wilson make no
measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment.” Id. The decision by
the Court was not unanimous. The dissenters argued that the decision
represented a disregard for the legislature’s authority and claimed that “it would
open the door for other felony offenders convicted of aggravated child molestation
to be ‘discharged from lawful custody.’” Id.
21
Wendy Koch, Defining A Sex Predator, For Life, USA T ODAY , July
25, 2007, at 3A.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
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registry. 27 Although the bill passed the House, it did not receive
enough votes in the Senate to become law.28
There are many individuals throughout the country with stories
similar to those of Wilson and Peterson.29 In Connecticut, Jeff
Davis, now twenty-two, was charged with a sex crime when he
was eighteen years old for engaging in sexual acts with his serious
girlfriend.30 Davis was a junior in high school when he met the
fifteen-year-old girl in study hall at school.31 They started out as
friends, then began to date, and fell in love.32 Davis says that they
often talked about their plans for the future—how they planned to
get married, buy a house, and create a life together.33 However,
when the girl started paying less attention to her schoolwork, her
father blamed Davis and Davis’s relationship with his daughter,
and he reported Davis to the Newington police.34 Davis was
arrested and convicted of second-degree sexual assault, even though
his girlfriend told investigators that she and Davis were dating and
27

Lauren R. Dorgan, Wife: ‘He’s Not a Predator’, CONCORD MONITOR ,
May 24, 2007, available at http://www.concordmonitor.com/apps/pbcs.
dll/article?AID=/20070524/REPOSITORY/705240323. Similar laws were
enacted in Oregon in 2007. See 2007 Or. Laws Ch. 609 (“No sooner than two
years, but no later than five years, after the termination of juvenile court
jurisdiction over a person required to report . . . , the person may file a petition
for relief from the duty to report.”).
28
Koch, supra note 21. HB 504, which some have called the “Laurie
Peterson” bill, passed a State House committee 18-0 in March, 2007. Dorgan,
supra note 27. It cleared a State Senate committee in May, 2007 on a 4–1 vote.
Id. On May 24, 2007, an amendment was rejected on the State Senate floor and
the bill was laid on the table. H. 504, 2007 Gen. Court, 116th Sess. (N.H.
2007). State Senator Joe Foster, who chairs the Senate committee that approved
the bill, said that he had new concerns about it and thinks it needs more work.
Dorgan, supra note 27. Other Senators said that they have heard concerns from
prosecutors and police that the bill does not comply with the Adam Walsh Act,
a federal law regarding sex offender registration. Id.
29
Hilda Munoz, A Plan to Redefine Teen Sex Offenders, HARTFORD
COURANT, May 3, 2007, at A1.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
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that she was a willing partner.35 If the age gap between the two
teenagers had been less than two years, Davis would not have been
arrested under the state’s second-degree sexual assault statute,
known in Connecticut as the “Romeo and Juliet” law.36 Although
he never served time in prison because his sentence was
suspended,37 Davis is now serving ten years of probation.38
As a result of his conviction, Davis was forced to register as a
sex offender,39 which has made moving on with his life quite
difficult.40 For instance, he has experienced harassment41 and has
had problems finding work. Davis, who wants to become a
firefighter, can only find work in warehouses or construction.42 Yet
even in those areas, his search is often futile and hopeless.43 He
35

Munoz, supra note 29.
Id.
37
Id. Senior Assistant State’s Attorney Louis Luba, who prosecuted
Davis’ case, said defense attorneys usually try bargaining for sentences that will
keep their clients out of prison. Id. He also said that he tries to find a just
resolution and considers a variety of factors including the age difference, whether
there was an ongoing relationship that the victim’s parents consented to, and
whether the younger teen lied about his or her age. Id.
38
Id. Probation conditions can restrict where a sex offender works and lives
as well as the people with whom he or she socializes. Munoz, supra note 29.
The conditions are often different for each offender, but many offenders are ordered
to attend sex offender treatment and most must have their pictures on the state
sex offender registry. Id. Davis is not the only teen convicted for having sex in
Connecticut under the second-degree sexual assault statute. Id. Between 1999
and February 2007 in Connecticut, teenagers over the age of sixteen were
convicted of 195 counts of the specific subsection that addresses teen sex. Id.
The average sentence for each conviction was slightly less than two years spent
behind bars, in addition to probation and required registration on Connecticut’s
sex offender registry. Id.
39
Munoz, supra note 29. He moved in with his uncle in February of 2007,
and almost immediately after he settled in, police officers arrived at the house
requesting information for the sex offender registry. Id. They asked for pictures of
him, his car, and his new home, and also knocked on his neighbors’ doors to
warn them that a sex offender lived in the neighborhood. Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. On one occasion, someone printed out dozens of copies of Davis’
page from the sex offender registry and left them in front of his home. Id.
42
Munoz, supra note 29.
43
Id.
36
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explains that even in his search for work in warehouses and
construction, if he is able to get his foot in the door and secure an
interview, employers almost always cut the interview short when
they hear about his conviction as a sex offender.44
These are merely three stories among the myriad of cases in
which teenagers who engaged in consensual sexual acts with other
teenagers have been arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and punished.
The stories of Wilson, Peterson, and Davis elucidate the need to
reform state statutory rape laws. These men had their lives altered
because they engaged in activity as teenagers in which more than
half of teenagers across the country participate.45 However,
because the law criminalizes their actions, they went from being
normal teenagers, with hopes of living fulfilling lives and pursuing
their dreams, to being convicted sex offenders, with
disappointment and despair clouding their existence. While
statutory rape laws are absolutely imperative to protect minors
from sexual predators and “those who would prey upon their
vulnerability,”46 it is problematic for those same laws to criminalize
consensual teenage sex47 because the harsh consequences that often
result from convictions under these laws may lead to cruel and
unusual punishment.48
Although some people believe that teenage sex is immoral, the
public’s view on morality should not be a component in
determining the scope of the laws.49 As the Supreme Court held in
Lawrence v. Texas, “[t]he fact that the governing majority in a
State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is
44

Id.
A 1995 study revealed that, by the age of sixteen, 50% of U.S. teenagers
have had sexual intercourse. Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex
With Minors: Defining A Role For Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV . 703, 703
(2000).
46
Id. at 710; see also Munoz, supra note 29 (“Sex offender laws were
designed to protect people from predators—pedophiles, rapists and the like.”).
47
This term is used by the author to refer to sexual acts between teenagers
who are at least 15 years old and with an age difference of four years or less
between them.
48
Brickner, supra note 18.
49
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003).
45
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not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice . . . .”50 Opponents of criminalizing consensual teenage sex
in statutory rape laws have averred that teenage sex seems to be
“more of a health or social issue than a crime.”51 Widespread
reform of statutory rape laws is essential because of the injustices
endured by then-teenagers such as Wilson, Peterson, and Davis.52
As many laws stand now, the punishment for consensual
teenage sex is disproportionate to the crime, and in fact may result
in cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.53 As such, statutory rape laws should be revised to
address the problem of harsh consequences that result from
convictions. Specifically, all states should implement age gap
provisions in their laws.54 If jurisdictions insist on criminalizing
acts of consensual teenage sex, the laws should be changed to
classify the activity as a misdemeanor.55 In addition, the
punishment for such a misdemeanor conviction should not include
jail time or sex offender registration, as they constitute cruel and
unusual punishment for engaging in consensual sexual activity. 56
50

Id. at 577.
Munoz, supra note 29.
52
Maureen Downey, Genarlow Wilson is Free . . . But Other Victim’s of
Georgia’s Sweeping Sex Offender Laws Are Not, ATLANTA J. & CONST ., Oct.
28, 2007, at B6 (“But Wilson is not the only young offender caught in a maze
of draconian sex laws . . . . Lawmakers must amend the sex offender registry law
so that it distinguishes between two immature high school kids hooking up at a
party to a pedophile molesting the toddler next door.”).
53
See Brickner, supra note 18 (“And while torture, drawing and
quartering, public dissecting, burning alive and disemboweling have since been
ruled by courts to be prohibited, in the area of sexual conduct, punishments that
most would consider cruel and unusual continue to be supported by state
legislators.”).
54
As of 2008, only 30 states have age-gap provisions that do not classify
consensual teenage sex as criminal. See Age of Consent Chart for the US—2008,
http://www.ageofconsent.us/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2008).
55
See Koch, supra note 21 (noting that seven states eased punishments for
teenagers convicted of consensual sex in 2007).
56
See Gilbert, supra note 1 (classifying Genarlow Wilson’s sentence of ten
years in prison with required sex offender registration upon release as “harsh”
and noting that “[t]he Georgia court system must not be familiar with the eighth
amendment.”).
51

NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND BARS

725

Finally, such laws should be applied retroactively because many of
the old laws require registration on sex offender registries for life,
and there may be other individuals who are serving sentences for
crimes which are no longer felonies.57
This Note will address the flaws in current state statutory rape
laws and the legislative remedies needed to prevent the unfairness
and cruel and unusual punishment already endured by teenagers
like Genarlow Wilson. Part I will provide a brief history of
statutory rape laws and the rationales behind the laws. Part II will
address the current status of consensual teenage sex and statutory
rape laws. This part will consider whether consensual teenage sex
is detrimental, the lack of uniform enforcement of sex offense laws,
and the consequences of a conviction for acts of consensual teenage
sex. Part III will discuss the Eighth Amendment and what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. This part will argue that
all acts of consensual teenage sex should not be legally sanctioned
and that many state laws lead to cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment. Finally, Part IV will discuss various
reform ideas that would eradicate the problems caused by the
current laws while preserving statutory rape laws for cases in
which there is true sexual coercion or exploitation.
I.

HISTORY OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS

Statutory rape laws originated in thirteenth century England,
and were first codified in English law in 1275.58 These early laws
prohibited sexual relations between adult males and young females
under the age of twelve.59 In the late sixteenth century, lawmakers
57

See R. Robin McDonald, Ga. Attorney General to Defend Sex Offender
Law on Two Legal Fronts, FULTON COUNTY D AILY R EP., Aug. 7, 2007,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1186412330969 (arguing
that it is unfair that registration laws apply retroactively when sex offense laws
do not apply retroactively).
58
Michelle Oberman, Girls in the Master’s House: Of Protection,
Patriarchy and the Potential for Using the Master’s Tools to Reconfigure
Statutory Rape Law, 50 D EPAUL L. R EV . 799, 800 (2001).
59
Daryl J. Olszewski, Statutory Rape in Wisconsin: History, Rationale,
and The Need For Reform, 89 MARQ . L. REV . 693, 694 (2006). The “initial
prohibitions . . . restrict[ed] only a male’s sexual relations with young females,
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in England lowered the age of consent to ten.60 The laws were
consistent with other laws in Europe and with other common law
efforts to protect children from exploitation.61
The United States adopted England’s statutory rape laws when
it adopted the English common law,62 and initially did not change
the age of consent.63 However, in the late nineteenth century,
“campaigns were launched to increase the age of consent in an
effort to further protect girls from male sexual aggression.”64
Accordingly, states increased the age of consent. 65 In a further
attempt to protect young, naïve girls from predators, “[s]ome
states provided increased penalties for adult men who had sex with
pre-pubescent girls, and [provided] lesser penalties when the male
and sought to ‘protect a father’s interest in his daughter’s chastity.’” Id. at 694–
95. The apparent reasoning behind the laws was that a non-virgin traditionally
was not as desirable for marriage, and she was “therefore less likely to bring
financial reward to her father upon marriage.” Oberman, supra note 58, at 802.
Thus, historically, statutory rape laws “aimed to protect the father’s property
interest in his daughter, and were an embodiment of the legal perception of
women and girls as ‘special property in need of special protection.’” Id. at 802.
The states extended legal protection only to virgins, causing statutory rape law
to serve “as a tool through which to preserve the common morality rather than
to penalize men for violating the law.” Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into
Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 8 DePaul J. Health Care
L. 109, 121 (2004).
60
Oberman, supra note 59, at 119.
61
Oberman, supra note 58, at 801.
62
Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis,
63 TEX . L. REV . 387, 403 (1984) (citing Rita Eidson, Comment, The
Constitutionality of Statutory Rape Laws, 27 UCLA L. REV. 757, 762 (1980)).
63
Olszewski, supra note 59, at 695. See also Oberman, supra note 59, at
119 (“Early American lawmakers set the age of consent at ten.”).
64
Olszewski, supra note 59, at 695. The campaigns were led by the
Women’s Christian Temperance Union and various other feminist leaders who
wanted to protect females from laws and cultural values that threatened their
health and prosperity and made them subordinate in society. Oberman, supra
note 58, at 803 (citing Jane E. Larson, Even a Worm Will Turn at Last: Rape
Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century America, 9 Y ALE J.L. & HUMAN . 1, 3–4
(1997)).
65
Olszewski, supra note 59, at 695. Some states raised the age of consent
as high as twenty-one. Id. However, the average age of consent was sixteen.
Oberman, supra note 58, at 803.
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was younger than the female.”66
In the 1970s, feminists began to express concerns that
statutory rape laws “perpetuated offensive gender stereotypes and
restricted the sexual autonomy of young women.”67 The reformers
“saw sexuality as a vehicle of power that in complex ways kept
women subordinated in society . . . .”68 The feminists called for
reforms to “make the laws gender neutral and thus remove the
implication that only females are inherently vulnerable.”69
Notably, while feminists called for reform of the statutory rape
laws, they did not call for their complete abolition because they
understood the importance of the laws in protecting young people
from sexual coercion and exploitation.70 As Professor Fran Olsen
noted:
On the one hand, [statutory rape laws] protect females; . . .
statutory rape laws are a statement of social disapproval of
certain forms of exploitation . . . . On the other hand,
statutory rape laws restrict the sexual activity of young
women and reinforce the double standard of sexual
morality. 71
These concerns show that there is a tension between the impulses
underlying statutory rape laws.72 Despite this tension, states have
continued to enforce statutory rape laws. 73
Today, while chastity concerns are no longer as prominent,
states provide various other reasons to justify statutory rape laws.
For instance, these laws are said to protect young people from
66

Oberman, supra note 59, at 119.
Oberman, supra note 58, at 807.
68
Id. at 803.
69
Olszewski, supra note 59, at 695.
70
Id. (“However, rather than seeking the abolition of statutory rape laws,
those feminists generally called for reforms to make the laws gender neutral and
thus remove the implication that only females are inherently vulnerable, but
rather all juveniles are in need of protection.”).
71
Oberman, supra note 58, at 807.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 809 (“[T]hese vestiges of concern over securing male control over
girls’ sexuality and protecting girls from harm are overshadowed by . . .
powerful new functions driving the enforcement of statutory rape laws.”).
67
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coerced sexual activity, 74 enforce morality, 75 prevent teenage
pregnancy,76 and reduce welfare dependence.77 Although states
may see these as valid reasons for enforcing statutory rape laws,
the goals these rationales aim to achieve can still be reached with
revised laws.78

74

Olszewski, supra note 59, at 698–99. This reason is most often cited as
a rationale for enforcing statutory rape laws because lawmakers think that the
power disparity in a relationship between a child and an adult means that the
child will be unable to resist the adult’s coercive influence. Id. (citing Oberman,
supra note 45, at 757). Proponents of this rationale also argue that a teenager is
incapable of meaningful consent and therefore any sexual conduct is
nonconsensual and that a person who engages in sexual conduct with a teenager
takes advantage of the teenager’s vulnerability. Id.
75
Olszewski, supra note 59, at 699. “Some people believe that any sexual
conduct outside of marriage is inherently immoral. Juveniles, in nearly every
situation, are prohibited from marrying and thus all sexual activity involving
juveniles can be seen as immoral.” Id.
76
Id. Some people argue that prohibitions on sexual activities other than
sexual intercourse are necessary because they may lead to sexual intercourse, and
prohibitions on sexual intercourse that do not result in pregnancy are appropriate
because there is an inherent risk of pregnancy. Id. at 700. In the 1990s, studies
indicated that adult men were the fathers of a high number of babies born to
teenage mothers, and this fact created concern because girls who have babies as
teenagers are less likely to be productive members of societythey are “less
likely to complete high school, less likely to marry, less likely to be able to
support their families, and more likely to require public assistance at various
points in their lives.” Oberman, supra note 58, at 808–09.
77
Olszewski, supra note 59, at 699–700. In The Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”), Congress concluded
that the rise of teenage pregnancies is severe and linked to predatory sexual
practices, and that an effective strategy to combat teenage pregnancy is
enforcement of statutory rape laws. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105
(1996).
78
Olszewski, supra note 59, at 700–01.
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II. T HE STATUS OF CONSENSUAL T EENAGE SEX AND STATUTORY
RAPE LAWS
A. Consensual Teenage Sex—Is it Really So Detrimental?
Consensual teenage sex in the United States is astoundingly
common.79 A 1995 study revealed that, by the age of sixteen, 50%
of U.S. teenagers have had sexual intercourse.80 Another study
shows that in the U.S., about 60% of unmarried eighteen-year-olds
are sexually active.81 In fact, it is estimated that there are more than
7 million incidents of statutory rape every year.82 However, it is
clear that most incidents are not prosecuted and do not lead to
arrests and convictions.83
Even though “rates of sexual intercourse are higher today than
they were forty years ago, there is little reason to believe that the
high rates of adolescent sexual activity reflect a new trend.”84
Instead, for many years, a large number of teenagers have engaged
in sexual activity which is technically illicit, likely unaware of the
illegality of their actions, and the criminal justice system has turned
a blind eye.85 Prior to the 1990s, statutory rape laws were rarely
enforced and often ignored.86 In the last years of the twentieth
century, studies revealed that a majority of teen pregnancies were
the result of sexual relations with adult men.87 As a result, interest
79

See Oberman, supra note 45, at 703.
See id.
81
Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent: Toward a New Generation of
Statutory Rape Laws, 4 V A. J. S OC . POL ’ Y & L. 287, 322 (1997).
82
Oberman, supra note 45, at 703–04. Because the current age of consent
under most state statutes is sixteen or older, “each incident of sexual intercourse
among that population is illiciteach constitutes a separate instance of statutory
rape.” Id.
83
See id. at 704 (“For any number of reasons, it would be unimaginable to
attempt to prosecute every instance of sexual contact with minors.”).
84
Id. at 704.
85
Id.
86
Oberman, supra note 58, at 808.
87
Oberman, supra note 45, at 705.
80
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in statutory rape legislation was reignited,88 and both federal and
state governments created policies encouraging the prosecution of
statutory rape.89 However, statutory rape laws should not be
universally applied to all cases of teenage sexual activity because
adolescent sexual activity is not inherently problematic.90
In fact, there is ample support for the position that adolescent
sexual activity may actually be beneficial.91 “[L]iterature on
adolescent sexuality suggests that adolescent sex can play a
positive role in young people’s lives, both through the nature of
the sexual experience itself, and through the potential for the
experience to serve as a growth tool.”92 Researchers have argued
that adolescent sexual experimentation “is one way in today’s
society for young people to gain a sense of independence from
parents, to begin the process of growing up and taking on adult
roles.”93 These positive aspects of adolescent sexuality support the
argument that adolescent sexual activity as a whole is not per se
detrimental.94
Despite these arguments that sexual activity may be beneficial
to young people, the issue of consent is a point of contention
among supporters of existing statutory rape laws because many
people believe that adolescents do not have the capacity to
consent.95 However, there are many adults that might also fall into
this category, “and the decision to treat intercourse as distinctive in
this way may simply represent a revival of the old view that
88

Id.
Oberman, supra note 58, at 809.
90
Kitrosser, supra note 81, at 322–23.
91
Id.
92
Kitrosser, supra note 81, at 322. Some have suggested that adolescent
sex may adequately “prepare an adolescent to deal with future relationships.” Id.
93
Id. at 323 (quoting SUSAN MOORE & DOREEN ROSENTHAL, SEXUALITY
IN ADOLESCENCE 65 (1993)).
94
Id. at 323.
95
Sherry F. Colb, A Ten Year Sentence for Marcus Dwayne Dixon: The
Pros and Cons of Statutory Rape Laws, F INDLAW ’S WRIT , Feb. 11, 2004,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20040211.html. ( “[A]t some level, we might
have doubts about the competence of a minor to ‘consent,’ in a meaningful way,
to sexual activity. Because of her youth, the minor might not fully appreciate the
full physical and emotional implications of her decision.”).
89
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‘maidens should be protected from the corruption of their
virtue.’”96 Also, recent studies show that adolescents often “make
meaningful choices through rational thinking about possible social
behaviors.”97 In fact, studies from the 1970s and 1980s show that
“fourteen-year-olds demonstrate adult levels of competency on
various measures when making decisions about medical treatment,
and that fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds generally have a great
capacity for abstract and ideological political thought.”98 Further,
and significantly, “[t]his reasoning capability often extends to
decision-making about sexual activity.”99 Overall, it is too
simplistic to propose that adolescents typically cannot make
reasoned decisions regarding consensual sexual activity in all
instances.100
However, even in the face of this evidence, many members of
the government and society still believe that statutory rape laws
are necessary to regulate adolescent sexual activity. 101 Due to the
recent concerns regarding teen pregnancy, there has been a
noticeable governmental effort to “reinvigorate the enforcement of
statutory rape laws.”102 This push has led lawmakers to consider
whether the criminal law should regulate adolescent sexual behavior
96

Id.
Lewis Bossing, Now Sixteen Could Get You Life: Statutory Rape,
Meaningful Consent, and the Implications for Federal Sentence Enhancement,
73 N.Y.U. L. REV . 1205, 1227 (1998).
98
Id. at 1227–28.
99
Id. at 1228. Other studies and evidence also show that many teenagers
make voluntary choices to engage in sexual activity. Id. at 1228–29 (citing
GAIL ELIZABETH W YATT ET AL ., SEXUAL ABUSE AND C ONSENSUAL SEX 23
(1993)).
100
Kitrosser, supra note 81, at 289 (“[T]o place all sexual activity in
certain age-based categories under the statutory umbrella of ‘assault’ or ‘rape’
misses the real issue, because it fails to isolate, name, and target those instances
of sex that are coercive and that should, for that reason, be subject to criminal
punishment.”).
101
See, e.g., Koch, supra note 21 (noting that Senator Eric Johnson, a
Republican in Georgia, believes Genarlow Wilson was fairly punished); see also
Munoz, supra note 29 (stating that Rep. Arthur O’Neill, a Republican in
Kansas, agreed that current laws “have resulted in gut-wrenching stories,” but
the legislature should not change the law so these teenagers do not get arrested).
102
Oberman, supra note 45, at 706.
97
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and if so, how the law can regulate such behavior.103 When
considering the relationship between the criminal law and
adolescent sexual behavior, lawmakers should bear in mind that
“the laws also shape attitudes and are, in turn, shaped by
prevailing social mores.”104 Laws which are “too out of step with
current thinking” are less likely to be obeyed or to significantly
influence whether teenagers decide to engage in sexual activity. 105
The prevailing modern view among lawmakers, judges, attorneys,
scholars, and members of society is that adolescent sexual behavior
is not completely destructive and should not be punished as a
serious criminal offense.106
B. Lack of Uniform Enforcement
Another issue with applying statutory rape laws to consensual
teenage sex is that the laws are not currently enforced uniformly
throughout the states and even within the states. 107 For example, in
the same courthouse where Genarlow Wilson was fighting for his
innocence in his trial, a twenty-seven-year-old teacher was
convicted for having sex with a seventeen-year-old student, which
is the type of crime statutory rape laws are intended to prevent.108
However, in contrast to Wilson’s ten year sentence, the teacher
received just three years’ probation and 90 days in jail.109 Similarly,
Wendy Whitaker, a woman in Georgia who had been convicted for
the same crime as Wilson when she was seventeen, was convicted
for engaging in consensual oral sex with a fifteen-year-old classmate
103

Id.
Kitrosser, supra note 81, at 326 (quoting SUSAN MOORE & DOREEN
ROSENTHAL , SEXUALITY IN A DOLESCENCE 77–78 (1993)).
105
Id.
106
See Kitrosser, supra note 81 (arguing that the laws should focus on the
destructive norms of adolescent sexuality rather than adolescent sexuality as a
whole); Gilbert, supra note 1 (noting that Judge Thomas Wilson said that the
fact that Genarlow Wilson was sentenced to spend ten years in prison was a
“grave miscarriage of justice”).
107
See Oberman, supra note 45, at 706 (noting that statutory rape laws are
currently “being selectively enforced in the absence of any coherent rationale”).
108
Pitts, supra note 2.
109
Id.
104
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while on school property, but her sentence was for five years of
probation.110 This lack of uniformity in enforcement of the current
laws is problematic because innocent teenagers may be subject to
harsh treatment due to poor displays of prosecutorial discretion.111
There are various reasons why states selectively enforce the
laws.112 Regardless of their rationales, this Note argues that such
selective enforcement is unreasonable, because it makes it difficult
for teenagers to know the scope of the laws.
C. Consequences of Conviction for Acts of Consensual
Teenage Sex
1.

Strong Labels and Classifications

Just as the enforcement of statutory rape laws differs among
states, so too does the label for the crime that is attached to acts of
consensual teenage sex.113 In Georgia, an act of consensual teenage
sex may be prosecuted as statutory rape, child molestation, or
aggravated child molestation depending on certain factors. 114 In
110

McDonald, supra note 57. Wendy Whitaker pleaded guilty to sodomy
and was sentenced to five years probation. Id.
111
See Colb, supra note 95 (“A remaining concern is the worry about
racism specifically, and discrimination more generally, that arises whenever
officials are vested with a large amount of discretion.”).
112
Oberman, supra note 45, at 735 (noting that states choose certain cases
to prosecute in pursuit of their fiscal self-interest); see also Pitts, supra note 2
(“[T]here are major disparities in the treatment of black kids and white ones
facing Georgia justice . . . . [T]he [27 year old] teacher who got off with a wrist
slap [for having sex with a 17 year old student] was—big surprise—white.”).
113
See Act of Apr. 26, 2006, secs. 10–11, 2006 Ga. Laws 571 (codified as
amended at GA . CODE A NN. §§ 16-6-3, 16-6-4 (2007) (teenage sex may be
prosecuted as statutory rape, child molestation, or aggravated child molestation);
Munoz, supra note 29 (teenage sex may be prosecuted as sexual assault).
114
GA CODE ANN . §§ 16-6-3, 16-6-4 (2007). A person commits the offense
of statutory rape when he or she engages in sexual intercourse with anyone under
the age of 16 who is not his or her spouse. §16-6-3. A person commits the
offense of child molestation when he or she does any immoral or indecent act to
or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent
to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of themselves or the child. § 16-6-4. A
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other states, such as Wisconsin, consensual teenage sex may be
prosecuted as sexual assault.115 In Massachusetts, a person may be
prosecuted for rape if the other individual is less than sixteen years
old.116 These labels are accompanied by stigma that can cause
immense psychological damage to teenagers who engage in
consensual teenage sex, and such disgrace is an additional
punishment which is not proportional to the crime.117
2.

Lack of Retroactivity

Many states have revised their laws to include age-gap
provisions118 and to classify statutory rape as a misdemeanor.119
person commits the offense of aggravated child molestation when he or she
commits an offense of child molestation which physically injures the child or
involves sodomy. § 16-6-4.
115
W IS. STAT . ANN . § 948.02(2) (West 2007) (“Second degree sexual
assault. Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has
not attained the age of 16 years is guilty of a Class C felony.”).
116
See MASS. GEN . LAWS ch. 265, § 23 (2007) (“Whoever unlawfully has
sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse, and abuses a child under
sixteen years of age shall, for the first offense, be punished by imprisonment in
the state prison . . . .”).
117
Laurie Peterson, A Lifetime of Shame for Consensual Sex,
MORALOUTGAGE.NET , July 27, 2007, http://www.moraloutrage.net/article.
php?story=20070727101752747.
118
Age-gap provisions provide that sexual conduct involving persons who
are close in age is either not criminal or punished at a lower level. See
Olszewski, supra note 59, at 706.
119
Olszewski, supra note 59, at 706. The states are: Alabama, ALA. CODE
§ 13A-6-62(a)(1) (2007); Alaska, ALASKA STAT . §§ 11.41.434(a), 11.41.436(a),
11.41.438(a), 11.41.440(a)(1) (2008); Arizona, ARIZ. REV . STAT . A NN. § 131407F (2007); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN . §§ 5-14-110(a)(2)(B), 5-14125(5)(B)(i), 5-14-126(2)(B), 5-14-127(a) (2008); California, C AL . PENAL CODE
§ 261.5 (2008); Colorado, COLO . REV . STAT . A NN. § 18-3-402(1)(d) (West
2008); Connecticut, CONN . G EN . STAT . §§ 53a-70(a)(2), 53a-71(a)(1) (2008);
Delaware, DEL . CODE ANN . tit. 11, §§ 770(a)(2), 771(a)(1), 772(a)(2)g,
773(a)(5) (2008); Washington D.C., D.C. CODE §§ 22-3008, 22-3009 (2008);
Florida, FLA . STAT . ANN. § 794.05(1) (West 2008); Georgia, GA . CODE ANN .
§ 16-6-3(b) (2007); Hawaii, HAW . REV . STAT . A NN. §§ 707-730(1)(c)(i), 707732(1)(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2007); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1508A(1)
(2008); Illinois, 720 ILL . COMP. STAT . ANN . 5/12-14.1(2)(c) (West 2007);
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For example, Georgia amended its law to provide that if the victim
is at least fourteen but less than sixteen years old and the person
convicted of statutory rape is eighteen years old or younger and is
no more than four years older than the victim, the person will be
guilty of a misdemeanor, rather than felony statutory rape.120
While these amendments and revisions reducing convictions for
consensual teenage sexual acts are a step in the right direction, the
laws still leave many people either in prison or forced to register as
sex offenders if they were convicted and sentenced before the laws
took effect.
Indiana, IND. CODE ANN . § 35-42-4-9 (LexisNexis 2008); Iowa, IOWA CODE
ANN . §§ 709.4(2)(c), 709.12(4) (West 2008); Kentucky, KY. REV . STAT . ANN .
§§ 510.050(1)(a), 510.060(1)(b), 510.130(1)(b) (Lexis Nexis 2007); Louisiana,
LA. REV . STAT . ANN . § 14:43.1(A) (West 2007); Maine, ME . REV . STAT .
ANN . tit. 17-A, §§ 254, 255-A, 260 (2007); Maryland, MD . CODE ANN .,
CRIM. LAW §§ 3-304(a)(3), 3-306(a)(3), 3-307(a)(3)-(5), 3-308(a) (Lexis Nexis
2007); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS. A NN. § 750.520e(1)(a) (West 2008);
Minnesota, MINN . STAT . ANN. §§ 609.342-345 (West 2008); Mississippi,
MISS. CODE A NN. § 97-3-65(1) (2007); Missouri, MO . A NN . STAT . §§
566.034, 566.064 (West 2007); Montana, MONT . CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-502(3),
(5)(b), 45-5-503(3)(a) (2007); Nebraska, NEB. REV . STAT. § 28-320.01(1)
(2007); Nevada, NEV . REV . STAT . ANN . §§ 200.368, 200.364 3.(b)
(LexisNexis 2007); New Hampshire, N.H. REV . STAT . ANN. §§ 632-A:4 (I)
(2008); New Jersey, N.J. STAT . ANN . § 2C:14-2 (West 2007); New Mexico,
N.M. STAT . A NN. § 30-9-11(F) (LexisNexis 2008); New York, N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 130.25, 130.30, 130.35, 130.40, 130.45, 130.50 (McKinney 2008);
North Carolina, N.C. G EN. STAT . §§ 14-27.2(a)(1), 14-27.4(a)(1), 14-27.7A
(2007); North Dakota, N.D. CENT . CODE §§ 12.1-20-03, 12.1-20-07 (2007);
Ohio, OHIO REV . CODE ANN . § 2907.04 (LexisNexis 2008); Oklahoma, OKLA.
STAT . ANN . tit. 21, § 1112 (West 2007); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT . § 163.345
(2007); Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CONS. STAT . ANN . §§ 3122.1, 3126(a)(8) (West
2007); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-6 (2007); South Dakota, S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7 (2007); Tennessee, T ENN . C ODE ANN . § 39-13506(a) (2007); Texas, TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . §§ 21.11(b), 22.011(d) (Vernon
2007); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-401(3), 76-5-401.1(2), 76-5-402.2(2)
(2007); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN . § 18.2-63 (2007); Washington, W ASH. REV .
CODE §§ 9A.44.073(1), 9A.44.076(1), 9A.44.079(1), 9A.44.083(1),
9A.44.086(1), 9A.44.089(1) (West 2008); West Virginia, W. V A . CODE ANN .
§§ 61-8B-3(a)(2), 61-8B-5(a)(2), 61-8B-7(a)(3), 61-8B-9(b) (LexisNexis 2008);
Wyoming, W YO . S TAT . A NN . §§ 6-2-303(a)(v), 6-2-304(a)(i) (2008).
120
Act of Apr. 26, 2006, sec. 10, 2006 Ga. Laws 571 (codified as amended
at G A. C ODE ANN . § 16-6-3 (2007)).
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This is especially unfair in light of the fact that other laws,
including laws relating to sex offenses, are applied retroactively. 121
For example, in Georgia, a 2006 amendment “retroactively bar[red]
anyone on the state’s sex offender registry from living, working or
loitering within 1,000 feet of a school bus stop or church.”122 As a
result of the amendment, people who were in compliance with the
law had to completely uproot themselves and their families.123
While the Georgia Supreme Court struck down the law in
November of 2007,124 legislators noted that they would likely
amend the statute and reintroduce the legislation in January. 125
Legislators are unable to justify the retroactive application of laws
that provide for further punishment for sex offenders who have
already served their sentence in light of the fact that the current
statutes for “sex offenders”—including teenagers who engage in
consensual sex—provide for less severe penalties which may not
include sex offender registration.
121

See McDonald, supra note 57. In Florida, a sex offender whose victim is
under eighteen years old cannot live where children congregate or within 1,000
feet of schools, parks, playgrounds, and public school bus stops. FLA . STAT .
§947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2007). In California, voters passed Proposition 83 in 2006,
which prohibits any registered sex offender from living within 2,000 feet of any
school, daycare facility, or place where children gather. H UMAN R IGHTS W ATCH ,
NO EASY A NSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US 112 (2007). The law
applies to all registered sex offenders. Id.
122
McDonald, supra note 57.
123
Id.
124
Goodman, supra note 16.
125
Id. Notably, the ruling only applies to the residency restrictions of the
law. The provisions that bar sex offenders from working or loitering in places
where children gather are still in effect. Id. In fact, in January of 2008, Georgia
legislators introduced HB 908, in order
to repeal certain provisions relating to residency and employment
restrictions for certain sexual offenders; to provide for restrictions on
where sexual offenders and sexually dangerous predators may reside,
work, volunteer, or loiter; to provide for a definition; to provide for
punishment; to provide for exemptions from certain residency and
employment restrictions; to provide for civil causes of action; to
provide for applicability; to provide for related matters; to repeal
conflicting laws; and for other purposes.
H.B. 908, 149th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2008).
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3. Sex Offender Registration Requirements
Teenagers who are convicted of sexual assault, child
molestation, or statutory rape must register as sex offenders under
both state law126 (in states where the offenses were and are still
felonies) and federal law.127 The Adam Walsh Act, which became
effective on July 27, 2006, requires each jurisdiction to maintain a
jurisdiction-wide sex offender registry conforming to the
requirements laid out in the Act. 128 Although there is a provision
for consensual teenage sex,129 the law applies retroactively. 130
Therefore, those people who were convicted before 2006 must
continue to register according to the requirements.131 Under the
Act, a teenager convicted of any sex offense132 will remain on the
126

Koch, supra note 21 (noting that Matthew Shettles, a teenager convicted
for having sex with his high school girlfriend when he was 18 and she was
weeks away from turning 15, “has had to register in Oregon whenever he
moved, got a new job, or made other life changes”); Munoz, supra note 29
(noting that in Connecticut, Jeff Davis is forced to provide information on the
state’s sex offender registry).
127
HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH , supra note 121, at 2.
128
42 U.S.C.A. § 16912 (West 2007). States will probably adhere to the
provisions of the Act, because it compels them to “either dramatically increase
their registration and community restrictions or lose federal law enforcement
grant money.” HUMAN R IGHTS W ATCH , supra note 121, at 12. Another
significant fact is that federal law is only a floor, and states may increase their
registration and notification requirements if they chose to do so. Id.
129
42 U.S.C.A. § 16911(5)(C) (West 2007) (“An offense involving
consensual sexual conduct is not a sex offense for the purposes of this subchapter
if the victim was an adult . . . or if the victim was at least 13 years old and the
offender was not more than 4 years older than the victim.”).
130
Maggie Jones, How Can You Distinguish a Budding Pedophile From a
Kid With Real Boundary Problems, N.Y. T IMES, July 22, 2007, at A1.
131
Id.
132
“Sex offense” is defined as
(i) a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or
sexual contact with another; (ii) a criminal offense that is a specified
offense against a minor; (iii) a Federal offense . . . (iv) a military
offense . . . ; or (v) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense
described in clauses (i) through (iv).
42 U.S.C.A. §16911(5)(A) (West 2007).
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national registry for life, and will have to register with authorities
every three months, every six months, or every year, depending on
the classification of the crime.133 Jurisdictions are instructed to
make all the information readily accessible on the Internet,134 and in
order to be in compliance with the law to receive federal funding,
they must provide extensive information.135 This Note argues that
these requirements are extremely burdensome and constitute an
additional, unreasonable punishment for teenagers who engage in
consensual sex.
Currently, at least twenty-nine states require individuals to
register as sex offenders for engaging in consensual teenage sex.136
133

Jones, supra note 130, at A1.
Tier III registrants are those who committed a sex crime punishable by
more than one year in prison and comparable or more severe than
aggravated sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact with a child under 13,
kidnapping of a child by someone other than the guardian, any sex
crime occurring after the offender was a Tier II offender or an attempt or
conspiracy to commit such an offense. Tier II registrants are those who
are not a Tier III offender and whose offense is against a minor, is
punishable by imprisonment of more than one year, and is comparable
to or more severe than sex trafficking, coercion and enticement,
transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, abusive
sexual contact, involves the use of a minor in a sexual performance . . .
or if the sex offense occurs after the offender becomes a Tier I sex
offender. A Tier I sex offender is defined as a sex offender other than a
Tier II or Tier III sex offender.
42 U.S.C.A. § 16911(2)-(4) (West 2007)
134
42 U.S.C.A. § 16918 (West 2007).
135
42 U.S.C.A. § 16914 (West 2007). This section requires the offender to
provide his or her name, social security number, address of each residence at
which he or she will reside, the name and address of any place where the offender
is or will be an employee, the name and address of any place where the offender
is or will be a student, and the license plate number and a description of any
vehicle owned or operated. Id. The section also requires the jurisdiction to
provide a physical description of the offender, the text of the provision of law
defining the criminal offense for which the offender is registered, the criminal
history of the offender, a current photograph of the offender, a set of fingerprints
and palm prints, a DNA sample, and a photocopy of a valid driver’s license or
identification card. Id.
136
The states are: Alabama, ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-63, 13A-11-200 (2008);
Alaska, ALASKA STAT . §§ 11.41.434, 12.63.010 (2008); Arizona, ARIZ. REV .
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Further, in eleven states, there are no “Romeo and Juliet
exceptions” for consensual teenage sex.137 Thus, in those states,
any teenager who has sex with a person below the age of consent
could be convicted and required to register as a sex offender,
regardless of whether it was consensual.138
Proponents of community notification argue that sex offender
registries make people feel protected by having knowledge which
purportedly will equip them to take more safety precautions.139 In
fact, the original policy underlying the need for registries was
concern for public safety. In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court
explained that sex offender registration was not intended as an
additional punishment for someone convicted of a sexual offense,
STAT . §13-1405 (2007); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-903, 5-14-110
(2007); Colorado, COLO . REV . STAT . §§ 16-22-03, 18-3-402 (2007);
Connecticut, CONN . GEN . STAT . §§ 54-250, 54-251, 53a-70 (2008); Florida,
FLA . STAT . ANN . §§ 775.21, 794.011 (2008); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 118-8-7, 11-8-8-5 (2008); Louisiana, LA . REV . STAT . A NN. §§ 15:542, 15: 541,
14:92(A)(7) (2007); Maine, ME . REV . STAT . ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11222, 11203
(2007) ME . REV . STAT . ANN . tit. 17-A, § 254 (2007); Maryland, MD. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-704, 11-701, 3-308 (2007); Massachusetts, MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN . ch. 6, § 178C, 178D (2008), MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, §
35A (2008); Michigan, MICH . COMP. LAWS SERV . §§ 28.723, 28.722,
750.520e (2008); Minnesota, MINN . STAT . § 243.166, Subd. 1b(a)(1)(iii),
609.345 (2008); Missouri, MO . R EV . S TAT . §§ 589.400, 566.032 (2007).; New
Hampshire, N.H. REV . STAT . A NN. §§ 651-B:1, 651-B:2, 632-A:2 (2008);
New Jersey, N.J. STAT . A NN. §§ 2C:14-2, 2C:7-2, 2C:14-3b (2007); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN . STAT . §§ 14-208.7, 14-208.6, 14-27.7A (2007); North
Dakota, N.D. CENT . CODE §§ 12.1-32-15, 12.1-20-07 (2007); Oklahoma,
OKLA. ST . tit. 57 § 582 (2007), OKL. ST . tit. 21 § 1123 (2007); Rhode Island,
R.I. GEN . LAWS §§ 11-37.1-3, 11-37.1-2; South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §
23-3-430, § 16-3-655; South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-2, 2224B-1, 22-22-7 (2007); Tennessee, T ENN . CODE ANN . §§ 40-39-202, 40-39203, 39-13-506 (2007); Texas, T EX . CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 62.002, 62.001
(2007); Utah, UTAH CODE A NN. §§ 77-27-21.5, 76-5-401, 76-5-401.2 (2007);
Washington, W ASH . REV . CODE §§ 9A.44.130, 9A.44.096 (2008); West
Virginia, W.V A. CODE §§ 15-12-2, 61-8B-9 (2008); Wisconsin, W IS. STAT .
§301.45, §948.02 (2007). HUMAN R IGHTS W ATCH, supra note 121, at 39–40,
n.110.
137
HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH , supra note 121, at 73.
138
Id.
139
Jones, supra note 130.
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but rather as a civil regulation imposed for the narrowly defined
interest in protecting the public safety. 140
However, “proponents of these laws are not able to point to
convincing evidence of public safety gains from them.”141 In a
recent report on sex offender laws in the United States, Human
Rights Watch has reported that there “is little public safety
purpose served by imposing registration requirements on those
who pose a minimal risk to the community.”142 There are no
persuasive arguments for why these teenagers should be forced to
register because there are no public safety gains, yet there are harsh
consequences for those teenagers who are placed on the registries
for engaging in acts of consensual sex.
For individuals convicted of a sex offense for engaging in
consensual teenage sexual acts, the registration requirements are
another form of punishment with grave repercussions.143 One
consequence of community notification is that as these teenagers
become adults, “they may struggle to stay in the mainstream
because they have a hard time finding and holding jobs.”144 Not
only do they have difficulty finding jobs in the professional arena,
but the prospect of securing a job at any business that performs
background checks is bleak.145 Thus, convictions for sexual
offenses “equate directly with job loss and [loss of] employment
opportunities, . . . and a general inability to provide for a future
family through gainful employment and parental involvement
(volunteering, coaching, and chaperoning) in the lives of future
140

538 U.S. 84 (2003).
HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH , supra note 121, at 3.
142
Id. at 46.
143
See Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in
Sex Offender Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. REV . 295, 369–70 (2006) (“In the
case of the strict liability offender, who has never been judged dangerous to the
community and who has never had the opportunity to meaningfully contest
inclusion in the registry, the punitive impact outweighs the civil nonpunitive
purpose of the registration statute.”).
144
Jones, supra note 130; see also Munoz, supra note 29 (Defense attorney
Fanol Bojka said “I’ve seen one too many kids lose their futures because of
these [probation and registration] conditions. You label a kid a sex offender at 18
and you’ve limited what the kid can do with his life.”).
145
Jones, supra note 130.
141
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children.”146
In addition to these difficulties that registered sex offenders
might experience, they might also be subject to legal residency
restrictions.147 States and municipalities have increasingly been
passing laws “that expressly forbid [registered sex offenders] from
living near places where children gather.”148 Approximately 400
municipalities across the country have enacted local zoning
ordinances restricting where sex offenders can live.149 Georgia is
one state that has applied residency restrictions. Ironically, the
Attorney General who argued that the state’s “Romeo and Juliet”
provision should not be applied retroactively simultaneously
argued that the Legislature should retroactively bar “anyone on the
state’s sex offender registry from living, working or loitering within
1,000 feet of a school bus stop or church.”150
Representatives in Georgia have not been shy about the reasons
behind these laws. Georgia State House Majority Leader Jerry
Keen, co-sponsor of the bill providing for residency restrictions,
stated, “[m]y intent personally is to make it so onerous on those
that are convicted of these offenses . . . they will want to move to
another state.”151 Although part of the law has been struck down
by the Georgia Supreme Court, legislators intend to redraft the law
and continue implementing residency restrictions.152 As a result of
146

Peterson, supra note 117. In a recent report on sex offender registration,
Human Rights Watch found that “private employers are reluctant to hire sex
offenders even if their offense has no bearing on the nature of the job.” HUMAN
R IGHTS W ATCH , supra note 121, at 81. “Those who tell prospective employers
that they are registered sex offenders cannot get hired, and those who do not tell
their employers are eventually fired if and when employers find out.” Id.
147
HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, supra note 121, at 100. (“At least 20 states
have enacted laws that prohibit certain sex offenders from living within specified
distances of places where children congregate.”).
148
Id.
149
Id. at 114. As of September 2007, at least twenty states had enacted
laws that restrict where registered sex offenders may live. See id. at 100.
150
McDonald, supra note 57.
151
HUMAN R IGHTS W ATCH , supra note 121, at 100 (citing Dick Pettys,
Republicans Unveil First Draft of Proposed Sex Offender Law, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Sept. 28, 2005).
152
Goodman, supra note 16.

M. COHEN A UTHOR IZED 2. DOC

742

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

residency restriction laws, individuals listed on state registries for
engaging in consensual teenage sex will be forced to move to
another area of the state or out of the state in which they reside.153
If they do not relocate, they may face arrest or prosecution.154 For
those individuals who are convicted for acts of consensual teenage
sex and serve what is already a harsh sentence for their conviction,
such additional punishment seems extremely harsh and
disproportionate to the crime.155
Another consequence of registration for these individuals is that
they “find themselves subject to the shame and stigma of being
identified as sex offenders on online registries, in some cases for the
rest of their lives.”156 As a result of the label and the requirement to
register as a sex offender, many of these individuals experience
“despair and hopelessness”157 and some have even committed
suicide.158 They are often ostracized from their communities. 159
Sometimes, individuals or communities resort to vigilante
violence against those who are registered sex offenders, even if they
are on the registries for acts of consensual teenage sex.160
Registrants reported a range of vigilantism to authorities, including
“having glass bottles thrown through their windows, being . . .
physically assaulted while the assailants yelled ‘You like little
children, right?’, . . . people repeatedly ringing the doorbell and
pounding on the sides of the house late at night,” and threats of
153

McDonald, supra note 57.
Id.
155
See Downey, supra note 52 (“The registry is a prison sentence in its
own right.”); see also Alex B. Eyssen, Does Community Notification for Sex
Offenders Violate the Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition Against Cruel and
Unusual Punishment? A Focus on Vigilantism Resulting from “Megan’s Law,”
33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 101, 135 (2001) (“Thorough analysis of community
notification laws . . . demonstrate that such programs are indeed punishment,
regardless of any supposed regulatory intent.”).
156
HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH , supra note 121, at 66.
157
Id. at 78 (citing Jill Levenson & Leo Cotter, The Effects of Megan’s
Law on Sex Offender Reintegration, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 298–300
(2005)).
158
HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH , supra note 121, at 78–79.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 87–88.
154
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imminent death. 161 Some vigilantism has been extreme. For
example, individuals listed on sex offender registries have been
killed because their information was accessed on the Internet.162
Many registered sex offenders “have been targets of violence
from strangers who take it upon themselves to ‘eliminate’ sex
offenders from communities.”163 In New Hampshire, Lawrence
Trant set fire to the homes of several registered sex offenders and
stabbed another registrant outside of his home.164 Donald Keegan
was arrested in New York for plotting to blow up a home where
four convicted sex offenders were living.165 In Bellingham,
Washington, Anthony Mullen killed two convicted sex offenders
he found on the state’s online registry.166 Mullen posed as an FBI
agent to enter the victims’ homes, “under the guise of warning them
that they were on a ‘hit list’ on the internet.”167 Once inside, he
then shot both of them in the head.168
Only fourteen states and the District of Columbia have statutes
that “specifically prohibit the misuse of registry information for
purposes of harassment, discrimination, or acts of vigilantism.”169
161

Id.
Jeff Tuttle, Vigilante Understands Marshall, BANGOR DAILY NEWS,
May 20, 2006, at 1. For example, in 2006, a 20-year-old Canadian man with a
list of 29 names and addresses from the Maine Sex Offender Registry went to the
homes of two convicted sex offenders, shooting and killing both of them. Id.
Both of the men were strangers to the killer, Stephen Marshall. He found their
names on the state’s website. One of the men was on the website because he was
convicted for statutory rape for having sex with his girlfriend two weeks before
her sixteenth birthday when he was nineteen. Jones, supra note 130.
163
HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH , supra note 121, at 89.
164
Tuttle, supra note 162.
165
HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH , supra note 121, at 89.
166
Tuttle, supra note 162.
167
HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH , supra note 121, at 89.
168
Tuttle, supra note 162.
169
HUMAN R IGHTS W ATCH, supra note 121, at 90. States with
prohibitions include: California, CAL . PENAL CODE §290.4(c) (2008);
Connecticut, CONN . GEN . STAT . §54-258a (2008); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §188326 (2008); Hawaii, HAW . REV . STAT . §846E-3(g) (2007); Kentucky, KY .
REV . STAT . §17.580(3) (2007); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS . ch.6,
§178N (2008); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN . §45-33-51 (2007); New Jersey,
N.J. STAT . §2C:7-16(b) (2007); New York, NY CORRECT. LAW §168-q(2)
162
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The Adam Walsh Act has a provision that requires states to
include a “warning that information should not be used to
unlawfully injure, harass, or commit a crime against any individual
named in the registry or residing or working at any reported
address.”170 However, it does not require that states specifically
prohibit the misuse of the information and make it illegal.171 Since
there is nothing that specifically prohibits people from harassing
and attacking individuals on the sex offender registries, individuals
whose names appear on the registries for engaging in consensual
teenage sex may easily become targets.172
III. STATUTORY RAPE LAWS AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”173 The
amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment,174 and it affirms the rights of individuals not to be
subject to excessive punishments. 175 This right derives from the
idea that punishment for a crime should be proportional to the
offense.176 Punishment is considered cruel and unusual if it
“subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and
(2008); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CONS. STAT . ANN . §9798.1(b)(2); South
Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN . §23-3-510 (2007); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN . §77-2721.5(22) (2007); Vermont, VT . STAT . ANN . TIT . 13, §5411a(h) (2008);
Virginia, VA . CODE A NN. §9.1- 919 (2008); and Washington D.C., D.C.
CODE §22-4011(d) (2008). HUMAN R IGHTS W ATCH , supra note 121, at 90,
n.308.
170
42 U.S.C.A. § 16918 (West 2007).
171
Id. ( “The warning shall note that any such action could result in civil or
criminal penalties.”) (emphasis added).
172
HUMAN R IGHTS W ATCH , supra note 121, at 93 (noting that community
members have used notification information to keep registered sex offenders from
moving into their neighborhoods and pushing them to leave if they already live
there).
173
U.S. C ONST . amend. VIII.
174
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam).
175
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
176
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
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distress.”177 However, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
words of the amendment “are not precise, and that their scope is
not static. Thus, the Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”178
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, a plurality of the Court held that
execution of any offender under the age of sixteen at the time of the
crime is unconstitutional.179 Significantly, the Court stressed that
“[t]he reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and
responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible
conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”180
Throughout all of the cases regarding cruel and unusual
punishment, the Supreme Court has looked to the number of states
that reject certain punishments to determine whether there is a
national consensus. 181 “Objective indicia” of society’s standards
may be found in legislative enactments and state practice.182 With
respect to finding a national consensus, “[i]t is not so much the
number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of
the direction of change.”183 A majority of states have either
decriminalized consensual teenage sex or reduced the crime to a
177

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (“He knows not what
discriminations may be established against him, what proscriptions may be
directed against him.”).
178
Id. (internal citations omitted).
179
487 U.S. 815, 818–38 (1988).
180
Id. at 835.
181
See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (concluding that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments did not proscribe the execution of
juvenile offenders over fifteen but under eighteen when 22 of the 37 death penalty
states permitted the death penalty for sixteen-year-old offenders and 25 of the 37
states permitted the death penalty for seventeen-year-old offenders); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment did not
mandate a categorical exemption from the death penalty for the mentally retarded
because only two states had enacted laws on the subject); Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the execution of the mentally retarded is cruel
and unusual punishment after finding that only a minority of states permitted the
practice).
182
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005).
183
Id. at 565 (citing Penry, 492 U.S. at 315).
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misdemeanor.184 Thus, the states are moving toward reducing the
punishment for such acts. 185
As noted in Roper v. Simmons, there is “sufficient evidence
that today our society views juveniles, . . . as ‘categorically less
culpable than the average criminal.’”186 Recently, the Supreme
Court articulated that the Eighth Amendment “contains a ‘narrow
proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital
sentences.’”187 Therefore, the punishment meted out to juveniles
should not be as harsh as those given to adults who are more
culpable, especially to adults who prey on children.
The Supreme Court maintains that deference should be paid to
state legislatures in determining punishments.188 States may impose
sentences with a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation,
deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.189 However, punishments
imposed by certain states for acts of consensual teenage sex are too
harsh to serve any of those justifications. “[W]hile torture, drawing
and quartering, public dissecting, burning alive and disemboweling
have since been ruled by courts to be prohibited, in the area of
sexual conduct, punishments that most would consider cruel and
unusual continue to be supported by state legislators.”190
The current
statutory rape laws in Kansas,191
184

See Olzsweski, supra note 59, at 706–07.
See Age of Consent Chart for the US—2008, supra note 54; see also
John Gramlich, States Revising Penalties for Young ‘Romeos’, PITT . POSTGAZETTE , July 22, 2007, at A6.
186
534 U.S. at 567 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316).
187
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (citing Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996–97 (1991) (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and
concurring in judgment)).
188
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25.
189
Id. (citing 1 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT , SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
§1.5, at 30–36 (1986)).
190
Brickner, supra note 18.
191
“Aggravated indecent liberties with a child is: (1) sexual intercourse
with who is more than 14 years of age but less than 16 years of age . . .
Aggravated indecent liberties with a child . . . is a severity level 3, person
felony.” K AN. S TAT . A NN. § 21-3504 (2007).
Unlawful voluntary sexual relations is engaging in voluntary: (1)
Sexual intercourse; (2) sodomy; or (3) lewd fondling or touching with a
185
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Massachusetts,192 Michigan,193 South Carolina,194 and Wisconsin195
child who is 14 years of age but less than 16 years of age and the
offender is less than 19 years of age and less than four years of age older
than the child and the child and the offender are the only parties
involved and are members of the opposite sex.
KAN . STAT . ANN . § 21-3522 (2007). Unlawful voluntary sexual relations is a
felony. § 21-3522; see also 2007 KANSAS LAWS CH . 183 (amending the 2006
laws providing requirements for sex offender registration).
192
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 265, § 23 (2007) (“Whoever unlawfully has
sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse, and abuses a child under
sixteen years of age shall, for the first offense, be punished by imprisonment in
the state prison for life or for any term of years, or, except as otherwise provided,
for any term in a jail or house of correction, and for the second or subsequent
offense by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years, but
not less than five years; provided, however, that a prosecution commenced under
the provisions of this section shall not be placed on file or continued without a
finding.”); see also MASS. GEN . LAWS ch. 272, § 4 (2007) (“Whoever induces
any person under 18 years of age of chaste life to have unlawful sexual
intercourse shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more
than three years or in a jail or house of correction for not more than two and onehalf years or by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by both such fine and
imprisonment.”); see also MASS. GEN . LAWS ch. 6 §§ 178C-Q (2007)
(providing requirements for sex offender registration).
193
“A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree if the
person engages in sexual penetration with another person and if any of the
following circumstances exist: (a) That other person is at least 13 years of age
and under 16 years of age.” MICH . COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520d (West 2007).
Criminal Sexual conduct in the third degree is a felony punishable by
imprisonment for not more than 15 years. Id. In addition, “Any man who shall
seduce and debauch any unmarried woman shall be guilty of a felony, punishable
by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 5 years.” MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.532 (West 2007); see also MICH. C OMP. LAWS . ANN .
28.722 (West 2007) (providing requirements for sex offender registration).
194
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-140 (2007) (“It is unlawful for a person over
the age of fourteen years to willfully and lewdly commit or attempt a lewd or
lascivious act upon or with the body, or its parts, of a child under the age of
sixteen years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or
passions or sexual desires of the person or of the child. A person violating the
provisions of this section is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be
fined in the discretion of the court or imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or
both.”). “A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree if
the actor engages in sexual battery with a victim who is at least fourteen years of
age but who is less than sixteen years of age and . . . is older than the victim.”
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violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment because the statutes punish consensual teenage sex as
felonies, impose lengthy prison sentences, and require convicted
individuals to register as sex offenders. The large number of states
that have revised their laws to include age-gap provisions and to
decriminalize consensual teenage sexual acts shows a national
consensus that punishing these acts as a felony with required sex
offender registration is cruel and unusual punishment.196 In
addition, the international community has recognized that many
laws created cruel and unusual punishments for engaging in
consensual teenage sex.197 Not only is the original punishment of
jail time or probation disproportionate to the crime of consensual
teenage sex, but these states also have laws that require these
individuals to register as sex offenders upon release.198
S.C. CODE ANN . § 16-3-655(3) (2007); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-430
(2007) (providing requirements for sex offender registration).
195
“ Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who
has not attained the age of 16 years is guilty of a Class C felony.” W IS. STAT .
ANN . §948.02 (West 2007). See also W IS. STAT . ANN. § 301.45 (West 2007)
(providing requirements for sex offender registration).
196
Currently, 47 states include age-gap provisions, but amongst those
states with such provisions, some states still make consensual teenage sex a
crime, albeit less of a crime. See Age of Consent Chart for the US—2008, supra
note 54.
197
In June of 2007, the Congress of Peru reformed the statutory rape laws to
declare that having consensual sexual relations with a person fourteen years old
or older is legal. Statutory Rape Law Reformed in Peru, LIVINGINPERU .COM,
http://www.livinginperu.com/news-4116-politics-statutory-rape-law-reformedperu (last visited Jan. 24, 2008). Before this reform, a person could be charged
with statutory rape and be sentenced to up to thirty years in prison for having
sexual relations with a person under the age of sixteen. Id. In Canada, “the
Criminal Code provides that any person who, for sexual purposes, touches any
part of the body of a person under the age of 14 is guilty of the offense of sexual
interference . . . . However, if the accused person is between the ages of 12 and
16 and the victim is less than two years younger than the accused and consented
to the activity, it is not considered a crime.” Susan A. Herman, Rape Law,
Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2007, http://encarta.msn.com/text_
761564013___2/Rape_(law).html (last visited Mar. 12, 2008).
198
See 2007 Kan. Sess. Laws Ch. 183 (amending the 2006 laws providing
requirements for sex offender registration); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6 §§ 178C-Q
(2007) (providing requirements for sex offender registration); MICH . COMP.
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The registration laws “subject[] the individual to a fate of everincreasing fear and distress.”199 As discussed earlier, registration
laws not only subject individuals to ostracism and depression, but
also to vigilante violence—all are additional forms of
punishment.200 In addition, states that refuse to apply their new
laws retroactively also violate the Eighth Amendment since
individuals convicted before the laws are amended will have to
serve their sentences and then suffer an additional punishment by
being forced to register upon release.201 However, if states consider
necessary reforms, the laws can conform to the requirements of the
Eighth Amendment.
IV. N ECESSARY REFORMS
A. Apply New Laws Retroactively
Some states modified their laws to reflect the view that
adolescent consensual sex is not a serious crime and should not be
punished as a felony with extensive sentences and forced
registration requirements.202 However, the new laws leave many
LAWS. ANN . §28.722 (West 2007) (providing requirements for sex offender
registration); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-430 (2007) (providing requirements for
sex offender registration); W IS. STAT . A NN. § 301.45 (West 2007) (providing
requirements for sex offender registration).
199
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (internal citations omitted).
200
HUMAN R IGHTS W ATCH , supra note 121, at 79, 87–88. See also
Carpenter, supra note 143, at 369–70.
201
See Downey, supra note 52 (writing that in Georgia, the Legislature
changed the statutory rape law so that consensual teenage sex is only a
misdemeanor, but “the Legislature did nothing to help the teenagers tripped up
by the old law.”).
202
See Gramlich, supra note 185. A new law in Florida allows teenagers
involved in consensual sexual activity with no more than four years between
them to petition to have their names removed from both state and national sex
offender registries. Id. In Indiana, lawmakers changed the law to decriminalize
consensual sex between adolescents if a court determines they are in a “dating
relationship” and are within four years of age. Id. In Georgia, H.B. 1059, enacted
in 2006, reduces the classification of statutory rape from a felony to a
misdemeanor by including an age-gap provision. 2006 Ga. Laws 571.
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individuals who were previously convicted without any remedy.203
Therefore, it is important to apply the new laws retroactively. If
the laws are not applied retroactively, many individuals who were
convicted for engaging in consensual teenage sex will still be subject
to punishment that is disproportionate to the crime.
In its report on sex offender registration, Human Rights Watch
makes some appropriate suggestions. 204 The report recommends
that “[s]tates should institute mechanisms by which offenders are
removed from registries if they are exonerated; their convictions
have been overturned, set aside, or otherwise vitiated; or if their
conduct is no longer considered criminal.”205 As for residency
restrictions, the report proposes that the laws should not apply to
entire classes of former offenders.206 In Georgia, the Attorney
General has argued that the law changing consensual teenage sex to
a misdemeanor with no registration requirement cannot be applied
retroactively, but that the retroactive residency restrictions are
legal.207 If laws regarding residency restrictions for sex offenders
may be applied retroactively, it is only fair that the laws
concerning their convictions and sentences should also have
retroactive application.
B. Change the Laws to Make Explicit Distinctions Between
Sexual Predators and Adolescents Engaging in
Consensual Sex
One of the most feasible and appropriate potential reforms of
statutory rape laws is for states to differentiate between dangerous
offenders and adolescents engaging in consensual acts. Such
distinctions are important because “[a] teenager could have a
203

See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 5. Since the Georgia legislature refused
to apply its new statutory rape laws retroactively, Genarlow Wilson spent over
two years in prison until the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that his sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment and released him on October 26,
2007. Id.
204
HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH , supra note 121.
205
Id. at 15–16.
206
Id. at 19.
207
McDonald, supra note 57.
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lifetime of hell because of a misplaced tag [as a sex offender]. On
the other hand, society could have a hellish situation if we don’t
identify the right people.”208 The right people to be identified are
sexual predators who prey on young children instead of teenagers
engaging in consensual sex with their classmates. 209
This year, laws enacted “in Connecticut, Florida, Indiana and
Texas, along with a bill waiting for the governor’s approval in
Illinois, try to draw clearer distinctions between sexual predators
and adolescents who pose less of a risk, such as those caught in socalled ‘Romeo and Juliet’ relationships.”210 These state policies
“take different approaches but share a goal of preventing low-risk
adolescents from facing the same penalties as serious predators.”211
Florida’s new policy permits individuals to petition to have
their names removed from state and national sex offender registries
if they engaged in consensual sexual acts with a person no more
than four years younger than them.212 This law is similar to the law
proposed by Laurie Peterson in New Hampshire and defeated by
legislators in the Senate. The Illinois bill would ensure that juvenile
sex offenders are not added to the state’s adult registry.”213 In
Indiana, the law calls for the courts to take a more involved and
detailed approach in each case because the law “decriminalizes
consensual sex between adolescents if they are found by a court to
be in a ‘dating relationship’ with an age difference of four years or
less.”214 Under that law, “[c]ourts will also have discretion to
determine whether violators should be included in the state’s sex

208

Gramlich, supra note 185 (internal citation omitted).
Koch, supra note 21 (quoting Oklahoma state Rep. Gus Blackwell as
saying, “[w]e’re trying to get pedophiles, not teenagers in a consensual
relationship.”).
210
Gramlich, supra note 185 (in Connecticut, lawmakers widened the age
gap from two years to three, and Texas revamped its risk-assessment system that
previously allowed some teenagers who had consensual sex with a younger
person to receive a higher risk rating than serious sexual predators).
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id.
209
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offender registry.”215 These reforms allow states to use their
statutory rape laws to catch sexual predators without leaving a
permanent taint on the lives of adolescents who engage in
consensual teenage sex, and therefore, all states should revise their
laws similarly.
In reforming the laws to create clear distinctions between sexual
predators and teenagers, states should look to a new program that
was adopted in Dane County, Wisconsin.216 The program
considered the opinions of the community and the goals that are
served by punishment. The Dane County State’s Attorney office
began by looking into the community’s values and opinions on
statutory rape cases.217 Members of an advisory group told
prosecutors that first-time young offenders should be educated and
efforts should be made to focus on prevention rather than mere
punishment.218 The members of the community were worried that
prosecutors were not distinguishing young statutory rape offenders
from predatory rapists and child molesters. 219
As a result of their meetings and discussions with the
community members, the prosecutors developed an “alternative
disposition program for younger offenders.”220 An integral aspect
of the program is that individuals convicted of statutory rape
offenses may choose to attend a nine-week class in sex education in
lieu of a prison sentence or probation.221 Significantly, if they
successfully complete the course, their conviction will not become
part of their criminal record.222 The program “reflects a balance
between the law’s capacity to set an exceedingly harsh punishment
for this crime, and the law’s obligation to take seriously the harm
that it is designed to remedy.”223

215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223

Id.
Oberman, supra note 45, at 773.
Id. at 774.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Oberman, supra note 45, at 774.
Id.
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C. Change the Laws on Sex Offender Registration
In addition to changing the penalties for consensual teenage sex,
states should also amend their sex offender registration laws so that
the lists only include sexual predators. Currently, teenagers in
many states are subjected to sex offender laws “for conduct that,
while frowned upon, does not suggest a danger to the community,
including consensual sex.”224 Teresa Younger, executive director of
the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union, argues that the public should
only receive information that they need to know, and that a list of
names and addresses and pictures does not necessarily provide
such information.225 The state should screen the information that
goes on to the website because
individuals listed are not just the dangerous scary rapists.
This is a situation potentially of a 19-year-old who has
consensual sex with a 15-year-old, then is prosecuted for
statutory rape, serves nine months in jail, and is now a
registered sex offender. That doesn’t help the citizens of
Connecticut know if he is violent or not violent.226
States should model sex offender registration laws after the
laws enacted in Minnesota, which provide for community
notification only on a need-to-know basis.227 The law states that
“[t]he extent of the information disclosed and the community to
whom disclosure is made must be related to the level of danger
posed by the offender . . . and to the need of community members
for information to enhance their individual and collective safety.”228
Public safety will still be protected if states utilize community
notification on a need-to-know basis. 229
Sex offender registries are intended to make the public aware of

224

HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH , supra note 121, at 8.
Jane Gordon, Ruling Opens Door to List Sex Offenders, N.Y. T IMES,
Mar. 9, 2003, at 6.
226
Id. Ms. Younger’s group advocated for hearings for convicted sex
offenders so they could be assessed for levels of “dangerousness.” Id.
227
HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH , supra note 121, at 11.
228
Id.
229
Id. at 12.
225
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sexual predators, not teenagers who engage in adolescent sex.230
Unfortunately, as many child safety and rape prevention advocates
believe, states are pouring money into “registration and community
notification programs that do not deal with the real causes of sexual
abuse and violence.”231 Unlimited online access to registry
information encourages people to ostracize former offenders,
making it less likely that they will be able to reintegrate into
communities.232 This community response “subjects the individual
to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress,” and is therefore cruel
and unusual punishment. 233
In order to address some of these problems, states should
reform their laws regarding sex offender registries. Offenders who
have committed minor, non-violent offenses, such as consensual
teenage sexual activity, should not be required to register.234 If
individuals have previously been required to register, states should
remove them from the registry if they are exonerated, if their
convictions are overturned or set aside, or if their conduct is no
longer considered criminal.235 If individuals convicted of a crime for
engaging in consensual teenage sex are not required to register, they
will not be subject to additionally harsh punishment.
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CONCLUSION
Consensual teenage sex should not be criminalized because, in
contrast to what many proponents of statutory rape laws argue,
adolescent sexual activity may be beneficial to teenagers.236
However, if states insist on regulating such acts, they must craft
the laws so that they do not subject teenagers to cruel and unusual
punishment for their actions. Currently, the laws of at least five
states appear to subject teenagers to cruel and unusual punishment
because the statutes carry a felony conviction with a prison
sentence. While it might be argued that a prison sentence alone
cannot constitute cruel and unusual punishment, a conviction for
statutory rape, child molestation, or sexual assault carries an
additional component. The convictions often require these
teenagers to register as sex offenders for a period of years or for the
rest of their lives, thus subjecting them to further punishment.
States must change their laws in order to protect teenagers from
receiving harsh punishments such as jail sentences for engaging in
consensual sex.
These states should follow suit with other states that have
revised the laws in order to completely decriminalize such acts or
to classify consensual teenage sex as a misdemeanor with less
severe punishment. Subjecting teenagers to such punishment
simply because legislators believe that teenage sex is immoral is not
justified by any theory of punishment. “Although juvenile sexual
conduct is not to be encouraged, the current prohibitions and
punishments are unnecessarily harsh and overreaching and fail to
take into account contemporary reality.”237
Revising the laws does not necessarily mean that the states will
be condoning sex between teenagers. Instead, the states will be
using the laws to prosecute the true targets of the laws—sexual
predators. States that have revised their laws to provide for lesser
penalties should apply the new laws retroactively so individuals
who were convicted under old laws are not subject to registration
236
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requirements and residency restrictions.238 Those states that have
not yet revised their laws should change the laws to make explicit
distinctions between sexual predators who pose a threat to children
and adolescents engaging in consensual sex.239 In addition, states
should change their laws on sex offender registration to guarantee
that adolescents who engaged in consensual teenage sex are not
included and therefore not subject to lifelong stigma and vigilante
violence.240 It is imperative that states employ these reforms so
they can eliminate injustice and ensure that their laws do not
violate the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.
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